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How New York City Used an Ecosystem Services Strategy Carried out  
Through an Urban-Rural Partnership to Preserve the Pristine Quality of Its Drinking 
Water and Save Billions of Dollars  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 The New York City Water system serves nine million people, eight million in 
New York City and one million in the suburbs north of the City.  It provides these 
customers with 1.2 billion gallons of water a day, delivered to 600, 000 residential and 
200,000 commercial building in the City, and close to two dozen local water systems in 
the northern suburbs.   
 
 New York City is a surface water system that gathers its water from three 
watersheds located well north of the City. These watersheds cover an area of 2,000 
square miles (830,000 hectares), nearly the size of the state of Delaware.  The City's 19th 
century watershed, the Croton River system, is located 15 to 25 miles (25 to 40 
kilometers) north of the City and east of the Hudson River in Westchester and Putnam 
counties, areas that were once rural but have now become (or are becoming) largely 
suburban.  The Croton supplies 10% of the City's water supply.  The City's 20th century 
watershed, the Catskill-Delaware system west of the Hudson, encompasses most of the 
Catskill Mountains, a rural area of farms, forests and small towns and a growing number 
of vacation home developments.  It extends 125 miles (200 kilometers) north of the City.  
The Cat-Del system, as it is generally called, provides 90% of the City's water. 
 
 Unlike most other major metropolitan cities with surface water systems, until the 
last quarter of the 20th century, New York had been able to avoid the enormous expense 
of building filtration works to treat and purify its drinking water.  In a series of farsighted 
decisions between 1830 and 1905 New York City rejected proposals to use questionable 
local water sources, which would have been considerably cheaper in the short term, and 
chose to make the large scale investments necessary to go as far north of the city as 
necessary to collect abundant, pristine water from unspoiled rural watersheds.   These 
decisions gave New York low cost, abundant water to support the City's growth while the 
pristine quality of New York City water has become legendary.   New York City water 
regularly beats bottled waters in blind taste and purity tests, is imported to England for 
tea tasting, to many other American cities for bagel and pizza making, and has been 
characterized as the "champagne of drinking waters." 
 
 But by the early 1980s, the shadow of water quality problems had begun to fall on 
the City's water system.   The Croton watershed was rapidly suburbanizing and under 
assault from non-point pollution sources.  By the end of the 1980s, the decision had been 
reluctantly made that ultimately the Croton would have to be filtered to maintain 
compliance with safe drinking water standards.  Filtering the Croton, which is currently 
scheduled to be completed in 2009, will cost well over $500 million to build the 
necessary filtration works and $50 million a year to operate them.  It will also have harsh 
impacts on the Bronx neighborhoods where the plant will be built. 
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 The City's failure to protect the Croton watershed naturally turned attention to the 
state of the Cat-Del watershed.  Though City officials insisted throughout the 1980s that 
Cat-Del water remained as pristine as ever, their assurances were received with growing 
skepticism.   Only 30% of the total land in the Cat-Del watershed was in public 
ownership and protected from development.  The remaining portion of the Cat-Del 
watershed had traditionally been devoted to family farm agriculture, woodlot forestry, 
and outdoor recreation based tourism, with a sprinkling of small local villages.  But by 
the 1980s the viability of those traditional rural activities was steadily declining and local 
residents were growing increasingly fearful about their economic future.  As farmers in 
the Catskills fought to stay in business, they were turning to increasingly concentrated 
agricultural practices that produced steadily increasing amounts of polluted runoff and 
soil erosion.   Forestry practices were increasingly characterized by high-grading of 
premium species, destructive road construction and other non-sustainable land 
management practices.  Land no longer suitable for agriculture or forestry was 
increasingly being put on the market for vacation home development.   Vacation home 
builders soon found they got the highest prices for houses with sweeping vistas or 
proximity to streams, both of which produced disproportionately high volumes of 
pollution.  Non-farm rural residents and the residents of the small local villages promoted 
such developments, including the major increase in road construction and road salting in 
the winter needed to keep them open, in the hopes of keeping their communities 
economically viable as farming and forestry declined.  All of these together contributed 
to a major increase in non-point source pollution and a major threat of future sewage 
contamination from misuse of rural septic systems by developers who had little or no 
interest in investing in Clean Water facilities. 
 
 By the end of the 1980s, an environmentally destructive pattern of land use was 
becoming the norm in the City's Cat-Del watersheds and was threatening to replace 
traditional land use patterns that had been compatible with the drinking water needs of 
the City.  Moreover, it was clear that existing American environmental regulations were 
not going to alter this.  American environmental policy in the water area has been notably 
successful in controlling sewage discharges from individual treatment plants or other 
urban point sources.  But it was then (and has largely remained up to the present) a 
byword for ineffectual failure when it comes to controlling the kind of non-point 
pollution sources that were growing in the Catskills.  Traditional models of command and 
control regulation did not work when the economic livelihood of individual farmers and 
other rural landowners was at stake.   Non-point source water quality regulations had and 
have failed to articulate a clear coherent set of obligations for individual landowners to 
follow, and have never given such landowners any incentive to follow them.  To 
individual farmers and others, struggling to remain in business on the rural landscape, 
both in the Catskills and throughout the United States, non-point source water quality 
regulation is nothing more than unrealistic, arbitrary, top-down thinking by urban 
interests who do not understand or care about the economic needs of the countryside.  
The resulting opposition of rural landowners and real estate developers to traditional non-
point source pollution control policies has combined with their own structural 
weaknesses to render them almost completely ineffectual. 
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 As Federal and state public health regulators pondered these realities, a consensus 
began to grow that the Cat-Del watershed should be filtered as well.  By the end of the 
1980s, public predictions were rampant that filtration of the City's Cat-Del water was 
inevitable.  This development produced consternation among City officials and the 
owners of the 807,000 buildings in New York City who paid the City's water and sewer 
rates.  The estimated cost of a filtration facility with enough capacity and backup to 
process the 1.35 billion gallons a day of water that the Cat-Del then provided the City (a 
figure that the extremely successful water conservation program carried out by the City in 
the early nineties has since reduced by about 250 million gallons a day) was $4 to $6 
billion dollars and the annual operating cost another $250 million annually.  The impact 
of such costs on the City's water and sewer rates would be disastrous.  
 
 Unfortunately for the City, traditional water quality strategies offered no way to 
avoid this course.  Filtration was the tried and true remedy to the non-point source 
pollution impacts of land development.  The unchallenged position of orthodox water 
quality regulators and water industry planners was that it was impossible to control land 
development.  Moreover, as discussed above it was also indisputable that attempts to 
address the non-point source pollutions associated with both agriculture and suburban 
development had been a dismal failure.   
   
 
Narrative - The Development of the City's Watershed Program 
 
 Thus, when this author become Commissioner of the New York City Department 
of Environmental Protection and Director of the New York City Water and Sewer system 
in early 1990, making a decision about what to do about preserving the purity of the 
City's drinking water sources and determining if there was any alternative to filtration 
was at the top of a very crowded agenda.   However, unlike nearly the entire American 
water industry and its regulators, both of which were dominated by civil and public 
health engineers who thought almost exclusively in facility construction terms to water 
quality problems, this author's background was in management reform, public finance 
and environmental policy, particularly land use; and he was experienced in addressing 
issues from an integrative, multi-partner, problem-solving perspective, rather than from 
the menu driven solutions of the traditional, single issue expert that had shaped the 
filtration debate until that point. 
 
 The author and his new management team were quickly convinced that allowing 
Catskill drinking water purity to deteriorate and then spending massive sums to clean it 
up was not the ideal option.   Initial calculations showed that a comprehensive program of 
watershed protection would cost far less than filtration, would maintain water quality 
even more effectively, and would produce numerous other benefits as well, both for New 
York City and also for the Catskills, whereas a filtration strategy would be nothing more 
than a money pit.  Thus the City made its basic strategy decision.  Instead of paying to 
clean up the results of degrading the water producing environment, the City would invest 
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in preserving the rural Catskill environment that was providing it with the world's best 
urban water. 
 
 The question then became how to translate that strategy into a detailed action 
plan.  More traditional water engineers, including virtually all of the EPA safe drinking 
water regulatory bureaucracy, argued for and expected the City to take a pollution source 
by pollution source approach, go after each identified water quality problem and plug it 
up.  And, in fact, the City's program included an aggressive component of hotspot 
cleanup, sewage and septic system upgrades, and other engineering and regulatory 
measures.  But the City rejected that as its basic framework for long term water purity 
protection.  The City concluded that the fatal flaw of such an approach was that it was 
reactive, it did not think in system terms, and it invariably tended to do no more than was 
necessary to meet whatever the current regulatory goal for water chemistry was.  Above 
all, it was treating symptoms, not causes.  It did not provide a basis for creating assurance 
that long term water purity could be comfortably maintained   
 
 Instead, the author and his team chose to place the ultimate focus of their filtration 
avoidance strategy on the Catskill environment itself.  As the author stated numerous 
times on behalf of the City, a good environment will produce good water.   And that 
made investing in the environment in an area 100 miles and more (160 to 200 kilometers) 
a smart and profitable investment for New York City. 
 
 The question then became what environmental investments should the City make.  
Some, such as adding to the publicly held land in the watershed, particularly critical lands 
threatened by development, stream corridor restorations and better stewardship of City 
owned lands were obvious.  But that did not answer the critical question:  how to control 
non-point source pollution on privately held farmlands and other rural landscapes. 
 
 The City realized that its first step had to be to make it clear that it intended to do 
so, come whatever.  It began to organize an unprecedented program of regulatory 
enforcement against non-point source pollution runoffs in its watersheds.  As the scope of 
the City's intentions became apparent, farmers and other rural landowners reacted angrily, 
denounced the City and vowed all out resistance to the New York City invaders who 
intended to undermine their livelihoods and destroy the value of their land.    
 
 Though the City could not afford to back away from that conflict, it fortunately 
realized that it should first seek to defuse it.  The City quietly approached the New York 
State Department of Agriculture and requested their assistance in creating a dialogue with 
the farming community.    New York State Ag. also made a thoughtful suggestion that 
helped set that dialogue on the course that ultimately led to the watershed agreement.  
They proposed that, instead of immediately proceeding to substantive discussions, the 
two sides first spend some time in mutual education.  Thus the City first provided for the 
farming community a soup to nuts primer on the specifics of preserving drinking water, 
the City's regulatory obligations, the risks it was trying to deal with and its overall 
strategy for doing so.  At the end of that discussion the farmers had begun to replace their 
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stereotypes of the City with a more reasoned understanding of the City's needs and were 
grudgingly acknowledging that the City had some real needs that had to be met. 
 
 Then it was the farmers' turn.  They took the City through the realities of their life 
as farmers in the Catskills, the economic pressures they faced, how they viewed the 
environmental problems their farms created, their own unhappy experience with non-
point source pollution regulations and the top-down solutions to that had always been 
thrust upon them, why they regarded the City's needs as unacceptable if approached 
traditionally, and why those that proposed them were seen as the enemies of farmers. 
 
 It was now the City's turn to alter its thinking and recognize that a new approach 
had to be taken.  The City then made another response that set for stage for the 
development of one.  Speaking for the City, this author stated that he did not accept the 
common conclusion of both farmers and environmentalists that they had diametrically 
opposed interests.  While acknowledging short conflicts on issues such as pesticide 
management, this author went to state that he regarded farmers and environmentalists as 
natural allies because they both had a vested interest in a working landscape.  For the 
City, the author stated, farming was a preferred land use in the watershed and that given 
what both sides had learned, they now faced the mutual challenge  of crafting a farmer-
friendly program of watershed protection. 
 
 That statement provoked both a positive reaction from the farm community but 
also a bit of a testiness about the mutual challenge language.  Instead, the farmers asked, 
would you be willing to let us design and run the program to control farm pollution?  In a 
response that would be repeated many times, the author replied that the City was up in 
the Catskill watershed to get clean water, not run a regulatory system.  If there was a 
better way to preserve drinking water quality the City would embrace it.   
 
 With that commitment, confrontation (though not considerable residual mutual 
suspicion) was replaced by innovation and the design of a mutually beneficial upstate-
downstate partnership began. 
 
 What the farmers developed was a program that came to be called Whole Farm 
planning.  Its basic features were as follows.  The City would pay both the operating costs 
of the program and the capital costs for pollution control investments on each farm as an 
incentive to farmers to join (Later a stipend for time was also added).  Farmers would 
administer the program through a self-selected Watershed Agricultural Council who 
would contract with local farm support services and academic resources to provide 
needed technical assistance, and with independent academic institutions for monitoring 
and research.  Instead of selecting a top down menu of best management practices to be 
applied to each farm, the program, with the full participation of each farmer, would 
custom design pollution control measures for each farm, to maximize their effectiveness 
and minimize their cost.  A particularly important feature of this custom design was that 
the measures would be selected not only for their pollution control benefits, but they 
would also be designed into and integrated with the farmer's business plan and 
management practice for his farm.  Thus the farmer would not only solve his pollution 
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problem cost free, but he would also gain significant ancillary benefits as well.  Often, 
these were not cash benefits, but time and ease of labor.  Many Catskill farms were 
cowshed dairy operations with enormous and time-consuming problems of manure 
disposal that were a major part of the farm pollution problem.  Generally the solutions to 
these problems the program developed were not only more efficient, they saved the 
farmer a significant amount of precious time and freed him from one of the most onerous 
aspects of his day, which proved to be a particularly valuable and attractive element of 
the program for many farmers.    
 
 Thus the name Whole Farm planning, designed to capture both the environmental 
and business aspect of the program.  Environmental protection and business improvement 
were integrated together in the program design and the investment plan.  Catskill farmers 
who had previously thought of the environment as something that forced them to spend 
their money to help others were now making money by becoming stewards of 
environmental resources, money that was helping them stay in farming.  It was a true 
mutual success story.   
 
 Before the program could be finalized however, two significant hurdles had to be 
overcome.  The farm community insisted that the program be voluntary with respect to 
any individual farmer.  A long and complex history made this issue, as the City realized, 
a deal breaker for them.  On the other hand, voluntary non-point source pollution 
programs had been, in American experience, a universal failure and to present a 
voluntary program as a centerpiece of the City's watershed effort would probably doom 
its credibility among those who would pass final review on whether or not it would 
provide the long term protection the City's water supply needed.    
 
 Finally, a way out of this dilemma was identified.  In trying to assure the City that 
a voluntary program would work, the farmers emphasized time and again to the City their 
willingness to be the City's water stewards if the City would provide the needed financial 
incentives to be so.  Very well, said this author for the City, we agree.  And we will 
provide the incentives and let the program be voluntary for any individual farmer.  Which 
meets your needs.  But in return you must meet our need, and our need is for an effective 
non-point source pollution control program with critical mass.  Therefore, you the 
farmers must commit to obtain participation in the Whole Farm program by 85% of all 
your fellow watershed farmers within five years.  If you meet that commitment well and 
good.   If you fail to meet that commitment the City will have the option of reverting to 
traditional water quality regulation with the only limitation being it will hold harmless all 
the farms who have actually participated in good faith in the program. 
 
 The farmers agreed, including most importantly that they would truly be on the 
hook for recruiting program participants. 
 
 The other issue was what should happen to the City's proposed new water quality 
regulations.  Many environmentalists argued that the Whole Farm program was 
potentially great, but the City should keep traditional water quality regulation as well.  
The farmers argued it was incompatible with an incentive based program.   In another 
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innovation, the City agreed that any farmer who participated in good faith in the program 
would be exempted from all other water quality regulations save only a rogue polluter 
provision. 
  
 Within five years after this program was established 93% of all farmers in the 
watershed had chosen to participate.  Whole Farm planning is considered to be one of the 
most successful non-point pollution control programs in the United States, and its results 
have played a major role in stabilizing and reducing watershed pollution loads and in 
enabling the City to avoid the multi-billion dollar cost of filtering the Cat-Del water 
supply.  Perhaps the greatest testimony to its success has been the growing number of 
reports of farmers outside the watershed's boundaries who keep asking how they can 
become part of the New York City watershed. 
 
 The watershed program has also served as a model for a Catskill forestry 
management program, for stream corridor management efforts in the watershed, and for a 
Catskill Development Council, which uses City money to strengthen town centers and 
limit sprawl type exurban and vacation home development in the City's watershed, and to 
identify opportunities for landscape compatible economic development for current 
residents of the watershed.  Each program of this component is designed around an 
ecosystem services model, one that seeks to provide economic opportunities to local 
residents in ways that are compatible with the preservation and enhancement of the 
ecosystem integrity of the Catskill landscape.   
 
 Today, nearly a decade later from the 1990 to 1993 period which put this program 
together, the City has succeeded in carrying out its good environment equals good water 
strategy.  There is little if any remaining interest in filtering the Cat-Del system.  True, 
like all mature programs, this detail or that detail of the watershed program is regarded as 
especially successful or needing work, there are parts of it that are ahead of schedule, 
some parts that are a bit lagging.  But overall, the City program has settled into the day to 
day life of a mature and accepted program, to the point where it what seemed almost 
revolutionary a decade ago now seems obvious and simple common sense.   And it is 
common sense to spend what will be no more than 1/8 of the cost of filtration on 
preserving water purity nature's way. 
 
 But the City's program has done more than just enormously benefit New York 
City.  The debate over watershed protection versus construction of filtration works that 
took place during the City's creation of the watershed program gave a major new impetus 
to watershed protection in the United States, which prior to 1990 was regarded by serious 
water and public health professionals as a great idea theoretically, but a piece of feel good 
fluff in practice.  The City's ecosystem services strategy has shown how to make 
watershed protection work economically and practically and is having ripples throughout 
the United States in a growing number of experiments in upstream downstream 
ecosystem service partnerships.   
 
 And New York City did not limit its innovations in ecosystem services to its 
watersheds.  Between 1990 and 1993, it carried out the largest water conservation 
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program in American history, permanently reducing its per capita water use by close to 
20% and, at the cost of roughly $500 million dollars saving the $3 to $5 billion dollars it 
would have cost to construct new water supply works on the Hudson River.  During the 
same period, it created a Bluebelt program for Staten Island that preserved and restored 
natural stream corridors and then integrated them into the City's master sewer plan for 
storm water management, saving several hundred million dollars in storm sewer 
construction costs while enhancing the natural character and amenity of Staten Island 
residential neighborhoods, significantly increasing their property values.  And it 
developed natural restoration programs for Jamaica Bay and a series of closed landfills 
that also saved major sums of capital. 
 
 The City's water and sewer system revenue totals over one billion dollars a year.  
In 1990, when this author became water and sewer system director, the water and sewer 
rates had been going up at an average of 14% a year for close to a decade.  When this 
author resigned, at the end of 1993, the annual rate increase was zero for two years, and 
has not exceeded the inflation rate until this year, 2002-2003.  There were two reasons for 
that financial success.  One was innovative management and financial reforms.  The 
second was major cost savings due to the widespread use of ecosystem services 
strategies.  During those years, the City was clearly committed to the environmental 
results an ecosystem services strategy produced more effectively than any others.  But it 
was equally committed to the bottom line for its building owners.  In using ecosystem 
service strategies, it found a way to be both. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 A paper like this inevitably foreshortens events, gives them more coherence and 
order then day to day life actually saw, suggests foreknowledge when the reality was 
more instinct and creative improvisation, and never does justice to the creative 
contributions and generosity of spirit of the many individuals whose personal decisions to 
work together and find something smart that would work, even if it challenged their own 
long-standing beliefs, made the City's watershed program a success in the face of 
professional and expert opposition, numerous political minefields, agency fears of losing 
bureaucratic control, and the inertia of many stakeholders, both urban and rural, starting 
with the City's own budget bureau, whose basic instincts were just to stall and hope the 
problem would go away.     
 
 Ultimately, the watershed program worked because the instincts of all those 
people were correct.  Investing in the City's watershed environment, both its natural and 
human resources, was the best way to insure the City a long term source of pure drinking 
water.   
 
 Today, this concept of linked investment in natural and human resources, which is 
being articulated and enriched as the idea of ecosystem services, is attracting widespread 
attention.   If this concept is to succeed, the City experience suggests several elements 
will be critical.  This conclusion will stress three of them.   
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 First, the ecosystem must be seen as including both its natural and human 
resources.  One cannot be sacrificed to the other.  The oft-hailed ideal of a win-win 
solution must not be understood to be just something for both, but to be maximizing the 
potential of both.  Similarly, in terms of the oft-stated model of urban-rural partnership, it 
is not the question so often posed of regional versus local values.  It is a question of 
reconciling one with the other.  That means, and it cannot be stressed enough, the 
legitimacy of both sets of values has to be recognized, and mutually recognized.  One of 
the most fundamental preconditions of the watershed agreement was the coupling of the 
recognition of Catskill residents that, like it or not (and most didn't at first) the City had a 
legitimate interest in seeking to protect the purity of its water, with the City's own humble 
acceptance that farmers in the Catskills were the best experts about what needed as 
farmers and on how to adapt essentially uniform water quality techniques to local Catskill 
conditions. 
 
 Second, what the Catskill experience vindicates is the economic validity of the 
concept of ecosystem services.  The Catskill experience does not necessarily represent a 
story of a market for ecosystem services.  Rather, it represents a critical first step on the 
way towards market development:  entrepreneurial success in exploiting a previously 
unrecognized economic opportunity.  Though many of the markets for ecosystem 
services are still nascent and emergent, ecosystem services present a raft of individual 
opportunities for entrepreneurial creativity at very high levels of economic return.  Every 
encouragement should be given to exploiting those opportunities, not only for their 
immediate benefits to both the landscape environment and those who live in it, but 
because it will be from the successful experience of doing so that the more structured 
ecosystem markets of the future will take their ultimate shape.  Ideally, the next decade 
will be a building decade of ecosystem entrepreneurs, not only in the private sector but, 
for the areas in which purely private investment may not yet be appropriate, public sector 
entrepreneurship as well. 
 
 Finally, as the New York City experience has drawn steadily more attention, some 
have raised the issue of whether or not the financial savings for New York City were so 
great that the New York City experience is unique and not particularly applicable to other 
ecosystem service situations.  That, this author would suggest, puts the cart before the 
horse.  The financial savings for New York were so great because it was receiving such a 
high level of ecosystem service, and because it was fortunate to have created water 
institutions that had the flexibility and financial resources to move quickly to seize those 
opportunities, once it discarded its own self inflicted blinders on how to use those 
institutions and deploy those resources. 
 
 In the hundreds if not thousands of other ecosystem service opportunities that 
exist, both in the United States and worldwide, that should be the twofold lesson.   First, 
identify and target as high a level as possible of ecosystem services, either real or 
potential, for the higher the level of service the higher the level of economic benefit.  
Second, find ways to monetize the service in a way that the value it creates can be 
captured, and reconfigure existing institutions and regulations so they can do so.  
Sometimes, as in New York City, it will only require a crisis and some outside the box 
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thinking to identify how to proceed.  Sometimes it will require more institutional 
creativity to create a payment stream that provides value for all parties or an institution 
that can capture and allocate it in an accepted, mutually beneficial way.  But whether it is 
New York or East Asia or Central Europe what will underlie the progress of ecosystem 
services is a simple truth.  The environment is about many things, beauty, biodiversity, 
sharing the earth's commons, the obligation humanity owes to the biological heritage of 
the past and the generations who will walk the earth in the future.  But the environment is 
also about economic resources, in this case the critical economic resource of ecosystem 
services, and the wise use of any economic resources, which is the ultimate goal of 
market systems, will always make more money than any alternative.  
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